History

THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1921:

helping students to think critically

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CONTENTS

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: helping students to think critically  
4

The enquiry-focused approach  
4

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: a contextual overview  
5

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: a glossary of terms  
6

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: timeline  
8

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: biographical notes on delegates  
9

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: useful websites  
17

The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: an enquiry question  
18

Step 1: What happened between July and October, 1921, that led to the Treaty negotiations which took place between October and December?  
19

Step 2: What were the main issues that arose in and around the Treaty negotiations between October and December?  
24

Step 3: What were the circumstances in which the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty were signed in the early hours of 6th December?  
32

Step 4: What divisions emerged in Ireland in December 1921, following the signing of the Treaty?  
36

Aftermath: two sources from the National Library of Ireland  
42

Card-sorting and critical skills  
43

Historians’ views about the Treaty negotiations  
49

Interrogating the historians  
50

Your conclusions on the enquiry  
50
The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: helping students to think critically

In exploring the case study, The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921, students are following a narrative of events. They are not concerned, however, merely with what happened (and, even here, there may be conflicts of interpretation) but also with why it happened, and what its historical significance is. In exploring issues of causation and significance with students, we have a great opportunity to develop their ability to think critically, which is one of the stated objectives of the syllabus, and an increasingly cherished aim of senior cycle education.

At previous history in-service sessions, it has been argued that some of the best ways in which students’ critical thinking can be developed include:

- the use of the enquiry-focused approach
- the use of ‘critical skills’ exercises that involve group discussion and judgement-forming

Both approaches are drawn on in the following exploration of the case study.

The enquiry-focused approach

The enquiry-focused approach involves organising a set of lessons around an enquiry question on which the teaching and learning activities are focused. It aims to give a clear focus to a series of lessons, to clarify for all concerned what the learning purposes are and to ensure that the sequence of lessons is leading to improved understanding on the part of the students.

In her book, The Twentieth Century World (The Historical Association, 1997), Christine Counsell outlines the rationale behind the approach. The following is an edited extract:

Choosing a sequence of interesting historical enquiries gives a clear focus to any scheme of work. This approach has a number of advantages:

(i) It prevents a superficial run through the content and leads pupils into deeper levels of historical understanding.
(ii) It allows students to engage in real historical debate. Historians usually begin with a question.
(iii) It motivates students by giving a clear focus to their work. Identifying key questions is a powerful way of ‘sharing clarity with learners’. Teachers are thus reinforcing that the whole point of a sequence of lessons or activities is to build towards some attempt at answering the question. Some teachers who use this approach will refer to such a question in every single lesson. Pupils are constantly reminded of what they are trying to do and why.
(iv) Key questions can shape and limit an otherwise sprawling content.
(v) It encourages pupils to produce more substantial and significant outcomes at the end of a section of work.

(pp.30-31)
The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: a contextual overview

From the establishment of the first Dáil in January, 1919, and the Soloheadbeg ambush on the day the Dáil first met, a state of armed conflict developed between the British state and the new Dáil government. The conflict has been variously described as the War of Independence, the Anglo-Irish War and the Troubles. For the members of the Dáil and their supporters, the conflict was in defence of the rights of Irish nationalists to assert the independence of Ireland. For the British government, the army of the Irish republic, the IRA, was a ‘murder gang’, a threat to law and order to be dealt with primarily by police forces rather than the army.

By June, 1921, both sides had reasons to attempt to end the conflict: numbers and supplies in the IRA were seriously depleted, and the British government faced a growing war-weariness at home and criticism of its reprisal policies in Ireland. The new Parliament of Northern Ireland, established under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, opened on 22 June. Once a new Northern Ireland government was in place, the British government began to make contact with Sinn Féin leaders and on 9 July, a truce was agreed (coming into effect two days later).

Between July and October, a series of discussions took place to try to work out a basis for a conference where the leaders on both sides would come together and talk about arrangements for a permanent end to the conflict. On 12 July, de Valera led a delegation to London. (Griffith, Stack and Childers were the other members.) Lloyd George made it clear that dominion status was as far as the British government could go; this was rejected by de Valera, and by the Cabinet and the Dáil on his return to Dublin. An exchange of letters between de Valera and Lloyd George followed. Eventually, on 30 September, it was agreed to hold a conference in London “to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire might best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations”. The conference took place in London from 11 October to 6 December, 1921, and ended with the Sinn Féin delegates signing their names to Articles of Agreement for a Treaty.

The Sinn Féin delegates were Arthur Griffith (Chairman of the delegation and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Michael Collins (Minister for Finance), Robert Barton (Minister for Economic Affairs), George Gavan Duffy and Eamon Duggan (both of whom had legal experience and were T.D.s). Erskine Childers was one of the secretaries to the delegation. De Valera’s decision to stay in Dublin has been much discussed subsequently. The delegates were described in their documents as ‘Envoys Plenipotentiary’. They were instructed to argue the case for ‘external association’ and to ensure that any breakdown in the negotiations happened on the issue of partition.

The British delegation was led by the prime minister, Lloyd George, and included Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead. The conference began and ended in Downing Street with some meetings taking place in other government offices.

In the course of the negotiations Griffith, and then the other delegates, were persuaded to accept the proposal for a Boundary Commission to address the unity issue. Under threat of war – and with the last minute concession of fiscal autonomy – the delegates signed the Articles of Agreement on 6 December, which proposed the establishment of an Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth.

Subsequently, the Cabinet (on 10 December) and, then, the Dáil itself (on 7 January, 1922) split on the issue (the Oath of Allegiance being particularly contentious) and by June, 1922, armed conflict had resumed as the armed forces of the two sides fought in the Civil War.

Note: The Articles of Agreement were ratified by the Cabinet (4-3) and by the Dáil (64-57).
The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: a glossary of terms

Develop your historical literacy

Articles of Agreement (for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland): This was the document signed on 6 December, 1921, by the British and Irish delegates at the London conference which had been meeting since October. The ‘Articles of Agreement’ had to be agreed by the parliaments of the UK and (Southern) Ireland before the Treaty became effective; notwithstanding this, the document is generally referred to as the Treaty.

Boundary Commission: A ‘boundary commission’ is often established to work out the precise border between newly-created states (such as India and Pakistan in 1947). During the Treaty negotiations, Griffith accepted a proposal for a boundary commission to “make the boundary conform as closely as possible to the wishes of the population.” Griffith and Collins believed that this would result in the transfer of significant amounts of territory from Northern Ireland to the Irish Free State. However, the final wording in the ‘Articles of Agreement’ stated that the wishes of the inhabitants had to be compatible with economic and geographical considerations. The Boundary Commission eventually met in 1924-1925.

British Commonwealth: By 1921, four countries previously under British rule had become self-governing ‘dominions’ which retained strong links with Britain: these were Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The notion of a ‘British Commonwealth’ had emerged to distinguish these countries from those still subject to imperial rule. The extent of the law-making powers of dominions did not become clear until the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931 (which ended the right of the Westminster parliament to legislate for dominion parliaments). The Treaty of 1921-1922 made the Irish Free State a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth.

Dominion status: The term is used to describe the degree of self-government given to former colonies of the British Empire beginning with Canada in 1867. Usually, the territory in question had a majority white population. There was no formal definition of the term until the Balfour Declaration of 1926.

Envoys plenipotentiary: ‘Envoys’ are people who represent their government on diplomatic missions abroad. ‘Plenipotentiary’ means ‘having full power’ i.e. plenipotentiaries have full power to negotiate settlements without referring back to their superiors.

External association: This was the idea that an independent Ireland would be linked with, but not a member of, the British Commonwealth. It was devised by Eamon de Valera as an attempted compromise between the dominion status on offer from the British government and the completely independent republic demanded by hardline republicans. It was rejected by Lloyd George when he met de Valera in July 1921 and, again, when it was submitted as part of the draft treaty presented by the Sinn Féin plenipotentiaries. De Valera included the idea in a document produced during the Treaty debates and generally known as ‘Document No. 2’. Document No.2 proved equally unacceptable to supporters of the Treaty (who saw little difference between it and Treaty and hardline republicans on the anti-Treaty side.
Fiscal autonomy: Fiscal autonomy means having the power to levy all taxes and other revenues required for a government to exercise economic sovereignty. Griffith had always emphasised that economic independence was as important as political independence.

Government of Ireland Act, 1920: This act attempted to deal with the issue of home rule for Ireland which had been left ‘hanging’ in 1914 when the implementation of the Third Home Rule Bill (1912) was suspended for the duration of the war. However, the Conservative majority in Lloyd George’s coalition government were determined to protect the position of the Ulster Unionists. The outcome was a decision to set up two parliaments, one in Belfast for Northern Ireland and one in Dublin for Southern Ireland. While the notion of a home rule Southern Ireland parliament was unacceptable to Sinn Féin, in Northern Ireland the Act provided the constitutional framework for governance for over fifty years. The implementation of the Act brought into effect the political partition of the island, though Sinn Féin, in the Treaty negotiations, argued for the ‘essential unity’ of the island.

Oath of allegiance: Under the terms of the Treaty, this was the oath to be taken by all members of the new parliament of the Irish Free State. Those who opposed the Treaty saw it as impossible to reconcile with the oath already taken to the republic. The oath differed from that used in other dominions in that ‘true faith and allegiance’ was sworn to the constitution and the promise to be faithful to the king was sworn by virtue of common citizenship with Britain and membership of the Commonwealth. While these differences were designed to make the oath more acceptable to Irish public opinion, the oath was the provision of the Treaty most bitterly opposed by its opponents.

The wording of the oath was as follows:

I … do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established, and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.

(See the point made about the oath by the historian Michael Laffan in Secondary Source E on p.49.)

Reprisals: ‘Reprisals’ are revenge attacks, or attacks carried out on an adversary as immediate punishment for killings carried out. The British government’s tacit support for reprisals carried out by Black and Tans and Auxiliaries attracted criticism in Britain as well as in Ireland.

“[…] almost worse in their effects than the atrocities by Crown agents were the explanations of them in the House of Commons.” Frank Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1962, p.129).
**The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: timeline**

1920

Government of Ireland Act: brought about the effective partition of Ireland, with the opening of a Northern parliament in June, 1921.

1921

May: IRA attack on Custom House resulted in arrest of over 80 men and 5 fatalities.

22 June: New Northern parliament (established under Government of Ireland Act, 1920) was opened by King George V who made an appeal for peace. (“... I pray that my coming to Ireland today may prove to be the first step towards an end of strife amongst her peoples, whatever their race or creed.”)

11 July: Truce came into effect.

14 July: De Valera met with Lloyd George in London (and again, on 15, 18 and 21 July.) On 20 July, Lloyd George offered dominion status, which de Valera refused.

10 August: Following rejection by Cabinet, de Valera sent official refusal of Lloyd George’s terms. A long correspondence between the two leaders followed.

30 September: de Valera agreed to proposals for a conference in London to begin on 11 October.

11 - 24 October: Conference – attended by all delegates – met seven times. After this, it split into sub-committees, the most important – that dealing with the contentious issues of unity and status – containing the leaders of the delegations (Griffith & Collins; Lloyd George, Birkenhead & Chamberlain)

24 October - 3 November: Provisional concessions made by Sinn Féin delegates; most significantly, Griffith’s letter to Lloyd George promising that, once he was satisfied on the issue of “essential unity” of Ireland and other key issues, he would recommend some sort of recognition of the Crown and association with the Commonwealth.

5 - 17 November: Lloyd George discussions with Craig; persuaded Griffith he was intent on achieving ‘essential unity’ of Ireland. Boundary commission proposed.

16 - 30 November: New British proposals presented (including formal proposal re. boundary commission); Sinn Féin proposals for ‘external association’ rejected.

1 - 6 December: Presentation of final British draft; delegates returned to Dublin; final two days of negotiation. “Articles of Agreement” signed on 6 December.

8 December: Dáil Cabinet split. For: Griffith, Collins, Barton and Cosgrave. Against: de Valera, Brugha and Stack.

1922

7 January: Dáil voted to accept Treaty by 64 votes to 57.
The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: biographical notes

(Main sources: Dictionary of Irish Biography and Oxford Dictionary of National Biography)

Sinn Féin delegates

Robert Barton (1881-1975)
Minister for Agriculture in the first Dáil, 1919. Elected to the second Dáil for Kildare-Wicklow (1921-1923), he was appointed Minister for Economic Affairs. Before the Treaty negotiations, accompanied de Valera to London for preliminary talks. One of three Dáil cabinet members at the Treaty negotiations, he was chosen because of his expertise in economic matters. Was the chief proponent of ‘external association’ within the delegation and was the last of the delegates to sign the Treaty.

Michael Collins (1890-1922) Key personality
Following his role as ADC to Joseph Plunkett during the 1916 rising and internment in Frongoch, North Wales, Collins was elected to the Sinn Féin executive in October 1917 and played a prominent role in the reorganised Volunteers. His intelligence network played a crucial role during the independence struggle, whilst his ‘Squad’ of gunmen (all members of the I.R.B. into which Collins was sworn in 1909) killed police agents and others who were seen as threats. As Minister of Finance in the Dáil government (from April 1919), director of intelligence in the IRA and a leading figure in the IRB, his dominant role was resented by some, notably Cathal Brugha (as Minister for Defence) and Austin Stack (as Minister for Home Affairs). His intelligence operation came under pressure in 1921 when Ned Broy and other informants were arrested and his offices were raided (in April). His acceptance of the truce in July 1921 was influenced by his assessment of the military situation.

Collins was not chosen to accompany de Valera to London in July for the early stages of negotiations. When selected in September as a delegate to the London conference, he suspected that he and Griffith had been ‘set up’ by de Valera to make a compromise that de Valera himself would not wish to make. He travelled to London on 9 October, a day after the other members of the delegation and stayed with his personal entourage at 15 Cadogan Gardens. Due to Griffith’s poor health, Collins was at times effectively head of the delegation. His decisions at this time appear to have been made on grounds of pragmatism: he signed the Treaty because it would bring about British military withdrawal from much of the country and accepted the boundary commission proposals as a way of preventing the northern issue from blocking a settlement between the British and Irish governments.

As chairman of the provisional government (from 14 January, 1922), he tried to appease the republican opposition, drawing up a republican constitution and agreeing a pre-election pact with de Valera in May. When he and Griffith were summoned to London in late May, he reluctantly agreed to make the constitution conform to the terms of the Treaty. The rejection of the provisional government’s authority by an IRA convention on 26 March and Collins’ effective repudiation of the pact with de Valera (by calling on voters to support his views) deepened the developing fault lines between the pro- and anti-Treaty sides. When Sir Henry Wilson was killed in London on 22 June (a murder for which Collins himself may have given the orders), the British government blamed the anti-Treaty IRA forces who had been occupying the Four Courts in Dublin since 14 April and demanded that they be confronted. Reluctantly, Collins ordered the bombardment of the Four Courts on 28 June.

In the ensuing Civil War, Collins was commander-in-chief of the new Free State Army and gave up his chairmanship of the provisional government. By August, the anti-Treaty forces had been driven from almost all of their urban strongholds and Collins began a military inspection tour of Munster. On 22 August, he was killed during an ambush in the valley of Béal na mBláth, close to his birthplace.
**Eamonn Duggan (1874/9-1936)**  

**George Gavan Duffy (1882-1951)**  
Eldest son of Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, Young Irelander, and prime minister of Victoria, Australia (1871-1872), he first came to prominence as solicitor for Roger Casement during his trial for treason in 1916. Subsequently moved to Ireland and was elected a Sinn Féin T.D. for Dublin County South in 1918. Acted as an envoy of the republic, representing the Dáil in Paris. Appointed as one of the plenipotentiaries at the Treaty negotiations due to his legal expertise. Felt morally bound to sign the Treaty when the other delegates had done so. Said in the Dáil debates on 21 December: “My heart is with those who are against the Treaty, but my reason is against them, because I can see no rational alternative.” Gradually became closer to de Valera whom he advised on legal issues. Later, had a distinguished legal career.

**Arthur Griffith (1871-1922)**  
Key personality  
Born into a working class Dublin family, Griffith followed in his father’s footsteps in becoming a printer. As a young man, he supported Parnell and developed radical nationalist views, being present at the first meeting of the Gaelic League. In South Africa (1897-1898), he began his involvement as a newspaper editor developing pro-Boer views that were critical of British policy in southern Africa. He returned to Ireland in autumn 1898 and launched the radical nationalist newspaper *United Irishman* with his friend Willie Rooney (d.1901). Publication ceased in 1908 when a libel action was brought against the paper, but another newspaper, *Sinn Féin*, soon appeared.

Griffith worked on a policy which he hoped would be supported by all nationalists from home rulers to republicans. The policy was set out in a series of articles in *United Irishman* from January to July, 1904, and re-printed in book form as *The resurrection of Hungary*. Griffith proposed a ‘dual monarchy’ (whereby an independent Ireland would accept the King of England as being also King of Ireland) as a means of securing the consent of unionists to Irish independence. In order to secure independence, he advocated that Irish M.P.s should withdraw from Westminster and establish a parliament in Dublin. This latter strategy was adopted by Sinn Féin in 1919.

Support for some of Griffith’s policies among radical nationalists groups eventually led to the formation of a ‘Sinn Féin’ party (the phrase – already in use for his newspaper and associated with his policies – seeming to sum up very well the diverse aspirations of the various groups). Charles Dolan, M.P. for North Leitrim, resigned his seat and fought the resulting by-election as an abstentionist candidate. Following his defeat, Sinn Féin did not contest any more parliamentary seats and Griffith concentrated on his work as a journalist and proponent of radical action. He joined the Irish Volunteers on their formation in 1913 and the radical element in the new force became known as the ‘Sinn Féin’ volunteers (because the phrase had become associated with radical nationalist policies). As a party, Sinn Féin had almost ceased to exist by 1914 though Griffith’s journalism kept him in the public eye.

Despite Griffith having no direct role in the 1916 rising, a number of factors spurred a modest recovery in the fortunes of his party after the rising: (1) the perception of a ‘Sinn Féin’ rebellion (due to the radical nationalist nature of the participants); (2) Griffith’s imprisonment following the rising; and (3) the sharp public reaction to the spate of executions and large-scale arrests. When Éamon de Valera was released from prison and elected as M.P. for Clare in 1917, Griffith stood down as president and was replaced by de Valera. The party now agreed to work towards a republic, but accepted that the people would choose their own form of government once independence had been won. At the party’s October ard fheis, Griffith was elected as vice-president and served de Valera as deputy over the next four years.
His leading role in opposing conscription in 1918, the withdrawal of Home Rule M.P.s from Westminster after the conscription bill was passed, and Griffith’s arrest in connection with the so-called ‘German plot’, all helped to ensure his election as M.P. for Cavan East. Following the Sinn Féin successes in the 1918 general election, his policy of withdrawal from Westminster was implemented and in the first Dáil government he was Minister of Home Affairs. When de Valera went to the US in June 1919, Griffith became acting president of the Dáil (until his own arrest at the end of 1920).

Following his release in June 1921, Griffith was one of those who accompanied de Valera to London for preliminary discussions with Lloyd George. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs on 26 August, the following month, Griffith was chosen as chairman of the delegation for the conference in London. In November, Griffith privately agreed to a proposal for a boundary commission and agreed a written summary prepared by Tom Jones: this document was later (5 December) produced by Lloyd George to dissuade Griffith from breaking on the issue of Ulster. Lloyd. George’s late concession of the principal of fiscal autonomy was also designed to win Griffith’s support. Griffith was first to sign the Treaty, indicating that he would sign even if his colleagues would not.

In the Dáil debates, Griffith defended the Treaty as providing the best terms available and as part of a process rather than a final settlement. He was a frequent visitor to London in 1922 as the provisional government tried to adopt a constitution that would be republican in nature, frequently defending positions that he himself considered unreasonable. The June elections saw pro-Treaty candidates receive 78% of the first preference vote and strong personal support for Griffith in Cavan. However, his health broke down and he was in a nursing home in Leeson Street, Dublin, when he died suddenly from a cerebral haemorrhage on 12 August, 1922.

**Sinn Féin secretaries to the delegation**

**John Chartres (1862-1927)**
Lawyer and civil servant, born in Birkenhead, England, he worked in the newly-established Ministry of Munitions from 1915 and, after the war, joined the Ministry of Labour. Became involved in Irish politics following a meeting with Griffith in 1917. Involved in intelligence work and gun-running for Collins. Under suspicion, he retired from the civil service and became republican envoy to Berlin in June 1921. Was recalled in October to act as second secretary to the Irish delegation at the Treaty conference in London. Though allied with Childers, Barton and Gavan Duffy, Chartres supported the Treaty out of respect for Griffith and Collins.

**Erskine Childers (1870-1922)**
Born in London, moved to Ireland at six years of age to live with his mother’s family, the Bartons, at Glendalough, following the death of his father. Studied at Cambridge, where he took a first in law in 1893. Was appointed joint assistant clerk at the House of Commons in 1895. His spy thriller, *The riddle of the sands* (1903) was a huge success. Became preoccupied with the Irish question, publishing a pamphlet, *The framework of home rule*, in 1911. Was the mastermind behind the ‘Howth gun-running’ in July 1914 in which his yacht, the *Asgard*, was used. Was an intelligence officer with the British forces in World War I.

In March 1919, he moved to Ireland to use his skills and contacts to support Sinn Féin. The reprisals carried out by British forces in Ireland and the imprisonment on two occasions of his cousin, Robert Barton, influenced his increasingly hardline republican views. Elected a Sinn Féin T.D. in 1921, he was close to de Valera and, as a secretary to the Treaty conference, sent reports back to de Valera on the negotiations. Had increasingly strained relations with Griffith and Collins. Tried to persuade his cousin, Robert Barton, not to sign the Treaty. Strongly opposed to the Treaty, he went on the run shortly after the
Civil War started. Was arrested at Glendalough on 10 November 1922, and charged with possession of a pistol (which had been given to him as a keepsake by Collins). Was executed by firing squad on 24 November.

**British government delegates**

**Lord Birkenhead (1872-1930)**

**Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937)**
Son of Joseph Chamberlain, leader of the Liberal Unionists, staunch opponent of home rule, and step-brother of Neville Chamberlain, future prime minister. First elected to parliament, 1893, as Liberal Unionist. First government office was civil lord of the Admiralty in 1895. (His father became colonial secretary.) Entered the cabinet as postmaster-general in 1902. Appointed chancellor of the exchequer, March 1903. Was a candidate for the Conservative Party leadership in 1911 but withdrew in favour of Andrew Bonar Law. In May, 1915, joined Asquith’s coalition government as secretary of state for India. Resigned from government, July 1917, but was appointed minister without portfolio in April 1918, with a seat in the war cabinet. Became chancellor of the exchequer again in January 1919. Succeeded Bonar Law as Conservative leader, March 1921.

**Winston Churchill (1874-1965)**
Churchill was born at Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, the family home of the dukes of Marlborough. (His father, Randolph, was the third son of the seventh duke.) When his grandfather was appointed Viceroy of Ireland in 1877, the Churchills moved to Dublin for three years, where Churchill was taken for walks in the Phoenix Park and told to beware of Fenians. After time as a cavalry officer and war correspondent, he was elected to parliament as a Conservative M.P. in 1900. His support for free trade prompted his switch to the Liberal Party in 1904.

In 1905 he was appointed to his first ministerial office, as Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office. In 1908 Asquith brought him into the Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade (at the young age of thirty-three), a role in which he worked closely with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George. In 1910 he was appointed Home Secretary and in 1911, First Lord of the Admiralty. In the latter role, his expansionist policy alienated radical members of the Liberal Party. During the Irish home rule crisis of 1912-1914, Churchill denounced Bonar Law and the Conservatives for inciting rebellion. The failures at Gallipoli and the decision by Asquith to invite the Conservatives into a coalition government led to Churchill’s resignation as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915. When Asquith was replaced as prime minister by Lloyd George, in December, 1916, Churchill was excluded from cabinet at the insistence of Bonar Law. Following a powerful speech on war strategy to the House of Commons in May, 1917, Churchill was appointed Minister of Munitions in July, 1917, despite loud protests from the Conservatives. After the December 1918 election, he was appointed Secretary for War and Air.
A strong supporter of Lloyd George’s policies in Ireland, he was appointed chairman of a cabinet committee on Ireland in June 1920. In May 1921 – having been appointed Colonial Secretary – he urged the government to enter into negotiations with Sinn Féin. As a member of the British delegation at the Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921, Churchill was chiefly responsible for the military clauses which involved the continuing use by the Royal Navy of three bases in the Irish Free State, the so-called ‘Treaty ports’.

**Sir Hamar Greenwood (1870-1948)**
Canadian-born, emigrated to England in 1895. Called to the bar in 1906, he became a KC (King’s Counsel) in 1919. Elected Liberal M.P. at 1906 general election, in April 1920 he joined the cabinet as the last Chief Secretary for Ireland. His defence of reprisals carried out by Crown forces attracted criticism. The truce was arranged without his involvement. He was one of the signatories of the Treaty.

**Sir Gordon Hewart (1870-1943)**
A barrister (from 1902) and Liberal M.P. (first elected 1913), Hewart was appointed Attorney-General in 1919, with a seat in the cabinet from 1921. He was appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1922.

**David Lloyd George (1863-1945)**
Born in Manchester to Welsh parents, Lloyd George was reared in Wales and qualified as a solicitor in 1884. Involved in politics from his teenage years, he was first elected to parliament for the Liberal Party in 1890. While he first came to prominence for his campaigning on Welsh national issues, his opposition to the government’s conduct of the Boer War first brought him to national prominence. When Campbell-Bannerman became prime minister in 1905, Lloyd George was brought into the cabinet as President of the Board of Trade and became Chancellor of the Exchequer following Asquith’s appointment as prime minister in 1908. Lloyd George introduced his ‘People’s Budget’ of 1909 as a “war budget” to “wage implacable war against poverty”.

The constitutional crisis caused by the House of Lords’ rejection of the budget led to the passing of the Parliament Act of 1911 which reduced the power of the Lords. When Asquith set up a wartime coalition in 1915, Lloyd George agreed to move to the newly-created post of Minister of Munitions. His success in this role made inevitable his appointment as Secretary of State for War in July 1916 after Kitchener was lost at sea. In that year, Asquith also asked him to try to resolve the impasse over home rule in Ireland: his short-lived attempt to work out a compromise was unsuccessful.

Lloyd George became prime minister on 7 December, 1916, replacing Asquith, following controversial discussions on ‘re-shaping’ the government. Most Liberal M.P.s remained faithful to the fallen Asquith, leaving Lloyd George heavily dependent on Conservative support. His wartime leadership led to a more centralised, presidential-style which was controversial; his dynamic leadership, however, led to his being hailed as the ‘man who won the war’. In 1917-1918, through the Irish Convention, he tried again to resolve nationalist-unionist differences on home rule, but these were unsuccessful against a background of the growth in support for the second Sinn Féin party.

One of the ‘Big Three’ at the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George’s role in agreeing harsh terms was criticised by the economist, J.M. Keynes. During the war of independence, 1919-1921, his government’s policy in Ireland – especially its support for reprisals - was controversial: he himself denounced the IRA as a ‘murder gang’ (*The Times*, 11 October, 1920). The king’s speech at the opening of the new Northern parliament in July 1921 marked a significant change in policy which led on to the July talks with de Valera and the subsequent conference in London, October-December 1921. The manner in which he brought matters to a head on 5-6 December has been much argued about and remains controversial.
Sir Laming Worthington-Evans (1868-1931)
Elected Conservative M.P. for Colchester in 1910, he quickly became known as a skilled parliamentary tactician and effective debater. During World War I he served in Lloyd George’s wartime coalition. He attended many of the post-war conferences with Lloyd George, playing a significant role in negotiations over German reparations. He was one of seven British negotiators of the Treaty.

Secretaries to the British delegation

Lionel Curtis (1872-1955)
A barrister and veteran of the Boer war, Curtis was instrumental in the arrangements which led to the establishment of the self-governing Union of South Africa in 1910. His ideas on governance in India influenced the shaping of the Government of India Act in 1919. In June, 1921, after a visit to Dublin, he co-wrote an article (with John Dove) advocating the fullest measure of dominion self-rule for Southern Ireland. This resulted in his appointment as second secretary (and, in effect, constitutional adviser) to the British delegation at the London conference, October-December, 1921.

Tom Jones (1870-1955)
A native Welsh speaker of working class origins, Jones studied Economics at the University of Glasgow and, subsequently, became lecturer there. He spent some time in Ireland in 1904-1905 as a visiting lecturer, becoming the first Professor of Political Economy in Queen’s University Belfast in 1909. However, after a year, Jones returned to Wales where he became secretary to the Welsh National Health Insurance commission. He went to London in 1916 to help Lloyd George in his bid to become prime minister. He subsequently acted as secretary to many cabinet committees and was secretary to the British delegation at the London conference, October-December, 1921, where he played a vital role as ‘go-between’ between Lloyd George and the leaders of the Irish delegation. His detailed diaries for the period 1916–30 were published in three volumes as Whitehall Diary between 1969 and 1971.

Other key figures

Cathal Brugha (1874-1922)
Born in Fairview, Dublin. Originally, Charles Burgess. Was active in the Gaelic League, and in the Irish Volunteers from their foundation in 1913. Involved in Howth gun-running, July 1914. During the 1916 Rising, was vice-commandant to Éamonn Ceannt at the South Dublin Union, where he was badly wounded and, subsequently, made only a partial recovery. Was involved in reviving the Irish Volunteers and served as chief of staff, October 1917-April 1919. Elected to Sinn Féin executive in October, 1917. During the conscription crisis of 1918, he objected to Sinn Féin’s cooperation with the Irish parliamentary party and resigned from the party executive in April. Elected T.D. for Waterford in 1918 election. In absence of de Valera and Griffith, was elected príomh aire (president) at the first meeting of Dáil Éireann, 22 January, 1919. On handing presidency over to de Valera in April 1919, was appointed Minister for Defence. A strong antagonism developed between himself and Michael Collins, as Brugha disapproved of military actions not approved of by him in advance.

Declined to take part in Treaty negotiations in 1921. While negotiations were in progress, grudgingly accepted de Valera’s ‘external association’ proposal as a way forward. Strongly opposed to treaty. In Treaty debates, January 1922, made strong personal attack on Collins, questioning if he ever ‘fired a shot for Ireland’, an accusation that was widely criticised. When the Treaty was passed, he was replaced as Minister for Defence by Richard Mulcahy. In March 1922, became a vice-president of Cumann na Poblachta. When shelling of Four Courts began on 28 June, 1922, reported for duty to Hammam Hotel, O’Connell Street. Refusing to surrender, charged into the street that now bears his name and was shot and seriously wounded, dying two days later in the Mater Hospital, 7 July, 1922.
James Craig (1871-1940)

Key personality

1st Viscount Craigavon, first prime minister of Northern Ireland. Born in Co. Down. Was one of the founding members of the Belfast stock exchange. Fought the Boers in South Africa, 1900-1901, as an officer with the Royal Irish Rifles. On death of his father in 1900, he inherited a fortune. First elected as unionist M.P. in 1906 (for Down East). Helped Carson become Ulster Unionist leader in 1910, the two men dominating the campaign against the Third Home Rule Bill of 1912. Stage-managed Carson’s public appearances including that on ‘Ulster Day’, 28 September, 1912. Actively involved in importation of guns. As advocate of six county exclusion from home rule, may be seen as architect of partition.

On outbreak of war in 1914, helped to create 36th (Ulster) Division, but resigned his commission in 1915 due to illness. In December 1916, on formation of second wartime coalition, given junior office as Treasurer of the Household and one of the government whips. Appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions in January 1919 and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty in April 1920. Was a significant influence on decision of cabinet committee drafting Government of Ireland bill to include a six county partition scheme.

In January 1919, accepted nomination as premier of Northern Ireland (after Carson declined the offer) and played the major role in shaping the new government and establishing security arrangements. Met de Valera on 5 May, 1921, at the behest of the British government, in an unproductive session. During the Treaty negotiations, resisted Lloyd George’s efforts to secure his agreement to an all-Ireland framework. Was angry about the boundary commission proposal but less worried about its terms than was Carson. Met Collins in January, February and March in an effort to defuse the I.R.A. campaign in Northern Ireland, but the ‘Craig-Collins pact’ of 29 March, 1922, quickly broke down. His handling of the Boundary Commission proposals in 1924-1925 is seen as assured.

Éamon de Valera (1882-1975)

Key personality

Born in New York, only child of Juan Vivian de Valera and Catherine (‘Kate’) Coll. Christened ‘Edward’. His father appears to have died in 1884. His mother’s employment in domestic service led to his return with his uncle, Edward Coll, to the family home at Bruree, Co. Limerick, in 1885. Went to school locally at first, but academic ability led to invitation to attend Blackrock College. In 1903-1904, accepted appointment as replacement of Mathematics and Physics in Rockwell College. Taught mathematics in the teacher-training college at Carysfort, Blackrock, 1906-1912. Joined the Gaelic League in 1908, subsequently marrying his Irish teacher, Sinéad Flanagan, in January 1910. In October 1912, appointed temporary lecturer and acting head of the Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Physics in St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth.

In November 1913, joined the Irish Volunteers at their inaugural meeting; his commitment led to his being appointed captain of the Donnybrook brigade. Involved in the Howth gun-running, July 1914 and sided with the minority who rejected John Redmond’s call to support the war effort in September. Appointed commandant of the 3rd Battalion in March 1915, became adjutant to Thomas McDonagh and was involved in discussions on a planned rising. His battalion occupied Boland’s Mill during the 1916 rising. Death sentence of 7 May was commuted to life imprisonment. His imprisonment, first in Mountjoy and, then, in four English prisons, greatly enhanced his revolutionary credentials. On release of remaining convicted prisoners, led the group home to Ireland by boat from Holyhead in June 1917. Following victory in East Clare by-election, he was elected president of Sinn Féin and president of the Irish Volunteers in October, 1917. At Sinn Féin ard fheis, as differences emerged between hardline republicans and those with more open minds, de Valera managed to secure unanimous backing for a compromise motion that, “Sinn Féin aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic. Having achieved that status the Irish people may by referendum choose their own form of government.” His role in the Conscription Crisis of 1918 enhanced his growing
reputation. Was imprisoned following ‘German plot’ allegations in May 1918. Was in jail for eight months, a period which spanned the December 1918 election and the first meeting of Dáil Éireann in January 1919. Escape from jail in February 1919 was organised by Michael Collins and Harry Boland. Elected president at meeting of Dáil Éireann on 1 April, 1919.

In June 1919, began his ‘American mission’ to secure recognition of Irish republic, dissuade US government from backing British policy on Ireland and to raise external loan. (Only the last was successful.) Returned to Ireland in December 1920. Met with James Craig on 5 May in an unproductive meeting. Supported attack on Custom House, 23 May, which led to arrests of over 80 IRA men. Following truce of 11 July, met Lloyd George four times in London between 14 and 21 July. Rejected an offer of dominion status with safeguards for British defence interests. Following a prickly correspondence between the two men, on 30 September accepted Lloyd George’s invitation to a conference in London.

His refusal to lead the delegation has been much criticised: reasons offered included that he needed to stay in Dublin so that delegates could justifiably delay signing any agreement until they had consulted with him. His ‘Document No. 2’, circulated during the Treaty debates, was an unsuccessful attempt to get unanimous backing for an alternative compromise. When Treaty was accepted on 7 January, he resigned as president but stood for re-election and was narrowly defeated. Tried to make a deal with Collins prior to June election to preserve unity, but ‘pact’ collapsed when Collins called on supporters to back Treaty. Electorate’s backing for Treaty candidates in June election disappointed de Valera who was further sidelined when the outbreak of civil war handed the initiative to the militarists. Re-joining his old battalion of the IRA, he did so as a private, an indication of his increasing powerlessness. After the Boundary Commission outcome in 1925, he resolved to offer a democratic alternative to Cumann na nGaedheal rule. Founded Fianna Fáil in 1926 and led the party into the Dáil in 1927, following the assassination of Kevin O’Higgins.

**Austin Stack (1879-1929)**

Born in Tralee, Co. Kerry, son of a well-known Fenian and Land League leader. Became a solicitor’s clerk and income-tax collector for the Dingle and Cahirciveen areas. (Was dismissed in 1915 due to his involvement in Irish Volunteers.) Served as secretary to the Kerry GAA county board, 1904-1908, and as chairman, 1914-1917. Was an active member of the Gaelic League and was sworn into the I.R.B. by Cathal Brugha. I.R.B. chief for Kerry, 1909-1916. Helped establish Irish Volunteers in Tralee, 1913. Informed by Pearse, February 1916, of plan to land arms at Fenit pier. Early arrival of Aud and arrest of Roger Casement at Banna Strand upset his planned arrangements. Was arrested and sentenced to penal servitude for life in June 1916. Released a year later, he set about reviving the Irish Volunteers and promoting membership of Sinn Féin. Active in Clare East and Kilkenny City by-elections, 1917, in which Éamon de Valera and W.T. Cosgrave were successful. Arrested in August 1917, led a hunger strike in which Thomas Ashe died. By time of his release in November 1917, had been elected joint secretary of Sinn Féin and executive member of Irish Volunteers. March 1918, appointed deputy chief of staff of Volunteers. Campaigned against conscription. Was re-arrested in May 1918 and sent to Crumlin Road jail in Belfast, where he was recognised by fellow Volunteers as ‘camp commander’. Returned unopposed as M.P./T.D. for Kerry West in December 1918 election.

From end of November 1919 to January 1922, was Minister for Home Affairs in Dáil government and oversaw establishment of ‘republican courts’ system. In July 1921, was one of those who accompanied de Valera to London for talks with Lloyd George. Strongly opposed Treaty, campaigning against it not only in Ireland but also among Irish-American supporters of Sinn Féin. Supported anti-Treaty forces in civil war becoming their ‘director of finance’. In October 1922, with other anti-Treaty T.D.s, set up a republican government in which he was ‘minister for finance’. Imprisoned 1923-1924. Remaining active in republican politics, staying with Sinn Féin when de Valera founded Fianna Fáil in 1926.
Useful websites

http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/: This National Archives website is an online exhibition which focuses on the signing of the Treaty in December, 1921. The ‘Documents’ section contains many documents relating to the negotiations between October and December. Other features include a short British Pathé newsreel clip on the signing of the Treaty and biographies of the delegates. (These are taken from the Dictionary of Irish Biography and the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, the main sources for the biographical notes on pp. 9-16 of this booklet.)

http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/The_Treaty_Negotiations_October-December_1921: This Multitext web page has a detailed summary and analysis of the negotiations and access to an extensive gallery of images. The Multitext website covers the wider aspects of the topic, including key personalities, as well as the other two case studies. Multitext is an initiative of the History Department, UCC.

http://www.difp.ie/browse-volumes/Volume.asp?VolumeID=1&st=ye&yr=1921: Many of the documents used in this booklet are taken from Volume 1 of the published Documents on Irish Foreign Policy. The documents for 1921 may be accessed by clicking on this link.

The Library Council’s Ask about Ireland website has a number of relevant resources e.g. http://www.difp.ie/browse-volumes/Volume.asp?VolumeID=1&st=ye&yr=1921 The full text of Frank Pakenham’s classic account of the Treaty negotiations, Peace by Ordeal, is available here. http://www.askaboutireland.ie/learning-zone/secondary-students/history/historic-film-clips/ This film clip collection includes coverage of the Treaty.


See also Mary Ó Dubháin’s excellent article on using the Irish Times digital archive in teaching the Treaty negotiations which was published in the 2008 edition of the History support journal, Teaching History, available at http://www.scoilnet.ie/hist/. (Click on the link to Teaching History, 2008, in the left-hand column.)
The Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921: an enquiry question

If students are to understand the issues and events of the case study, they will need to explore the circumstances in which the Treaty negotiations began, the main threads of the negotiations and the ultimate outcome and why it resulted in divisions. An enquiry such as the following can help to bring key issues and developments to the fore:

What happened between July and December 1921 that led to major political division in Ireland?

Step 1: What happened between July and October 1921 that led to the Treaty negotiations which took place between October and December?
Step 2: What were the main issues that arose in and around the Treaty negotiations between October and December?
Step 3: What were the circumstances in which the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty were signed in the early hours of 6 December?
Step 4: What divisions emerged in Ireland in December 1921, following the signing of the Treaty?

Introduction to the enquiry

The new parliament of Northern Ireland – a ‘home rule’ parliament established under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 - opened on 22 June, 1921. In his speech at the opening, King George V called for reconciliation in Ireland saying, “Few things are more earnestly desired throughout the English-speaking world than a satisfactory solution of the age-long Irish problems which for generations embarrassed our forefathers, as they now weigh heavily upon us.” Lloyd George made reference to the king’s speech when he wrote to de Valera with peace proposals on 24 June. In his Multitext article on the Treaty negotiations, the historian Gabriel Doherty writes:

While most attention has focussed on the precise words used by the king on this occasion, which were far more accommodating than recent statements of British politicians, it was the partition of the island itself which the formal opening of the parliament symbolised that was more significant. The establishment of this Unionist-dominated entity undermined, as far as the British were concerned, the claims of the Sinn Féin leadership to speak for all of the Irish people. This was to prove a useful tool in the negotiations over the course of the summer months and left an indelible mark on the final form of the Treaty itself.


A possible ‘hook’ to begin the enquiry

One way to begin the enquiry would be to show the students the Pathé film newsreel on the signing of the Treaty at http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/. The king (mentioned above) and a number of the delegates are shown smiling after the signing. The enquiry will explore what brought matters to this point of apparent success and the causes of the divisions that were soon to follow.

Possible questions: See if students can identify Barton, Griffith, Collins, Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Chamberlain, Churchill, the king. Ask why some of the delegates look tense.
On 1 July, *The Irish Times*, under the headline “Irish Peace Proposals”, published the text of a letter sent by Lloyd George to de Valera the previous week (24 June), in which he wrote:

**Source 1A**

I write, therefore, to convey the following invitation to you as the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland, and to Sir James Craig, the Premier of Northern Ireland:

1. That you should attend a conference here in London, in company with Sir James Craig, to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement;
2. That you should bring with you for the purpose any colleagues whom you may select. The Government will, of course, give a safe conduct to all who may be chosen to participate in the conference.

© *The Irish Times*, 1 July, 1921. Used with permission.

Craig accepted the invitation. De Valera replied that before replying more fully, he was “seeking a conference with certain representatives of the political minority in this country.” This conference with Southern Unionists including Lord Midleton, took place in the Mansion House, Dublin, on 4 July. In the course of the conference, it was agreed that negotiations could not take place unless there was a cease-fire. Lloyd George indicated his acceptance of this in a letter to Lord Midleton on 7 July (published in *The Irish Times*, 9 July). De Valera expressed his acceptance in a letter to Lloyd George on 8 July, as follows:

**Source 1B**

Sir,

The desire you express on the part of the British Government to end the centuries of conflict between the people of these two islands, and to establish relations of neighbourly harmony, is the genuine desire of the people of Ireland.

I have consulted with my colleagues, and secured the views of representatives of the minority of our nation in regard to the invitation you have sent me. In reply, I desire to say that I am ready to meet and discuss with you on what bases such a conference as the proposed can reasonably hope to achieve the object desired.


On Monday, 11 July, the truce came into effect and hostilities ceased.

Show your historical understanding:

1. In Source 1A, how does Lloyd George describe de Valera’s leadership role? Is this the way that de Valera himself would have described his role?
2. In Source 1A, what title is Sir James Craig given? Why do you think Lloyd George wanted Craig to attend the proposed conference in London?
3. In Source 1A, why did Lloyd George find it necessary to promise “a safe conduct” to people who might be chosen by de Valera to attend the proposed conference?
4. Why do you think that de Valera organised a conference “with certain representatives of the political minority in this country”, before giving a full answer to Lloyd George’s invitation?
5. What TWO important developments arose from the Mansion House conference on 4 July?
Show your historical understanding: matters for classroom discussion

1. Name the three political leaders represented in the cartoon. (The ‘Conductor’ is the British prime minister of the time.)
2. What difficulties does the cartoonist suggest the British Government will have in trying to bring about peace in Ireland?
3. How does the cartoon portray the British prime minister’s role in the proposed peace negotiations?

Embedded text in cartoon: whole-hog demands, extreme terms, No compromise deals, Sinn Fein, Peace, Irish peace express, “stand-firm” obstinacy, Ulster, one-eyed negation, Nothing doing “Loyalty”?

Following the truce, de Valera led a delegation to London for talks. He was accompanied by Robert Barton, Erskine Childers, Arthur Griffith, Count George Plunkett, Austin Stack, Kathleen O’Connell and Laurence O’Neill.

The picture to the right – from a contemporary postcard – shows de Valera on the boat from Dún Laoghaire – in conversation with Sinn Féin Director of Publicity, Desmond Fitzgerald.

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/moloney/photos/postcard/postcard386r.jpg
De Valera met with Lloyd George at Downing Street on four occasions between 14 and 21 July. De Valera also met with Craig on 15 and 18 July. On 20 July, Lloyd George put forward the Government’s proposals, which offered dominion status subject to certain restrictions (on such areas as defence and trade) and gave no commitment to ending partition. These proposals were rejected by the Cabinet and then the Dáil. The reasons were set out in a letter sent by de Valera to Lloyd George on 10 August. The following is a short extract:

**Source 1D**

To the extent that it implies a recognition of Ireland’s separate nationhood and her right to self-determination, we appreciate and accept it. But in the stipulations and express conditions concerning the matters that are vital the principle is strangely set aside and a claim advanced by your Government to interference in our affairs, and to a control that we cannot admit.


In a subsequent letter on 24 August, de Valera wrote:

**Source 1E**

On the basis of the broad guiding principle of government by the consent of the governed, peace can be secured – a peace that will be just and honourable to all ... To negotiate such a peace, Dáil Éireann is ready to appoint its representatives, and, if your Government accepts the principle proposed, to invest them with plenary powers to meet and arrange with you for its application in detail.


An *Irish Times* report on 5 September (following the publication of de Valera’s reply) ended as follows:

**Source 1F**

The situation created by Sinn Féin’s reply is regarded in London as one of extreme gravity. The Lord Lieutenant left Ireland last night by destroyer, on his way to Scotland, presumably to see the Premier.

© *The Irish Times*, 5 September, 1921. Used with permission.

**Show your historical understanding**

1. (a) According to Source 1D, what principle has Lloyd George recognised that de Valera says, “... we appreciate and accept ...”? 
   (b) According to Source 1D, what aspects of Lloyd George’s offer are not acceptable to de Valera and Sinn Féin?  
2. In Source 1E, on what basis does de Valera say the Dáil is ready to enter into negotiations? 
3. According to Source 1F, how was Sinn Féin’s rejection of Lloyd George’s terms viewed in London? What other development appeared to bear this out?
Following further exchanges of letters, both Lloyd George and de Valera acknowledged that – as de Valera put it in a letter of 19 September – “misunderstandings are more likely to increase than to diminish ... by a continuance of the present correspondence.” Neither leader was prepared to recognise the other’s stated position; however, both were eager to get talks underway. Lloyd George, therefore, in a letter of 29 September, wrote:

**Source 1G**

... We, therefore, send you herewith a fresh invitation to a conference in London on October 11th, where we can meet your delegates as spokesmen of the people whom you represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations.


De Valera responded on 30 September. He wrote:

**Source 1H**

Our respective positions have been stated and are understood, and we agree that conference, not correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding. We accept the invitation, and our Delegates will meet you in London on the date mentioned ‘to explore every possibility of settlement by personal discussion.


Show your historical understanding:
1. In Source 1G, comment on Lloyd George’s use of the phrase, “the people whom you represent”.
2. What was to be the purpose of the conference, according to Lloyd George in Source 1G?
3. In Source 1H, what does de Valera mean when he writes, “Our respective positions have been stated and are understood”?
4. In Source 1H, does de Valera sound optimistic or pessimistic about the negotiations?

On 14 September Dáil Éireann had already chosen a delegation of plenipotentiaries, in anticipation of a possible conference with representatives of the British Government:

Arthur Griffith, Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chairman); Michael Collins, Minister for Finance; Robert Barton, Minister for Economic Affairs; Eamon Duggan, Deputy for Meath and Louth; George Gavan Duffy, Deputy for County Dublin.

The photograph shows four of the five delegates on their way to the London talks on 8 October, 1921: from left to right, Robert Barton, Arthur Griffith (leader of the delegation), Eamon Duggan and George Gavan Duffy. The fifth delegate, Michael Collins, travelled separately on the following day.

The following instructions to the plenipotentiaries were dated 7 October, 1921:

**Source II**

(1) The Plenipotentiaries have full powers as defined in their credentials.
(2) It is understood however that before decisions are finally reached on the main questions that a despatch notifying the intention of making these decisions will be sent to the Members of the Cabinet in Dublin and that a reply will be awaited by the Plenipotentiaries before the final decision is made.
(3) It is also understood that the complete text of the draft treaty about to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin and reply awaited.
(4) In case of break the text of final proposals from our side will be similarly submitted.
(5) It is understood that the Cabinet in Dublin will be kept regularly informed of the progress of the negotiations.

**Show your historical understanding:**

1. What is the meaning of ‘plenipotentiaries’?
2. In what ways do the other instructions appear to contradict the meaning contained in the word ‘plenipotentiaries’?

The plenipotentiaries were also given a document, *Draft Treaty A*, which set out the essential elements of a settlement from an Irish perspective. It envisaged a form of association with Britain whereby an independent Ireland would be voluntarily associated with the British Commonwealth for purposes of common concern and would recognise the authority of the Crown as head of that association. The proposed arrangement became known as ‘external association’. (See Glossary.) Some clauses of this draft treaty – including clauses on Ulster – had not been completed before the delegation left Dublin.

The photograph below shows the full delegation in December 1921 after the Articles of Agreement were signed.

Seated, left to right: Arthur Griffith, Eamon Duggan, Michael Collins (at table) and Robert Barton.

Standing, left to right: Erskine Childers (secretary to the delegation) Charles Gavan Duffy and John Chartres (secretary to the delegation).
### Step 2: What were the main issues that arose in and around the Treaty negotiations between October and December?

#### Significant developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 October</td>
<td>Conference began. Plenary session of all delegates. Positions stated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 October</td>
<td>Last full plenary session. Irish draft proposals presented. (Subsequent negotiations carried on between sub-committees of the two delegations.) Griffith and Collins met with Lloyd George and Chamberlain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 November</td>
<td>Series of meetings between Griffith and Collins and Lloyd George, Lord Birkenhead and Chamberlain. Main focus: Griffith letter on recognition of king.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November</td>
<td>Meeting between Griffith and Lloyd George. Griffith agreed to written proposals on Ulster issue (used later by Lloyd George in a way that Griffith had not anticipated.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 November</td>
<td>Irish ‘memorandum’ set out a summary of discussions to date, repeating proposal on ‘external association’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>Lloyd George offered to put into writing any phrase which would guarantee Ireland’s equal status with Canada as a Dominion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>British counter-proposals presented, including an Oath of Allegiance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December</td>
<td>Irish delegates returned to Dublin. Cabinet met to hear from delegates discuss British proposals. Divisions evident. Decisions: original instructions to be followed; no consent to Oath of Allegiance as worded; if required to end negotiations, break on Ulster; no final agreement without reference to Dáil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>British team left the discussions when Gavan Duffy suggested membership of Empire was unacceptable. Sense of crisis point reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Lloyd George met Collins regarding boundary commission proposal. Afternoon: final session began. Lloyd George produced written agreement of 12th November, indicating Griffith prepared to accept Empire if effective boundary commission established. Also threatened immediate resumption of war if delegates did not sign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December</td>
<td>2:10am, Articles of Agreement signed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Commentary

The two main issues that arose were the Crown and Ulster. Defence was also an important issue for the British side, who feared an independent Ireland could be used as a base from which to attack Britain.

**The Crown**: The British wanted Ireland within the Empire, with MPs/TDs swearing an Oath of Allegiance to the Crown. The Irish argued for ‘external association’.

**Ulster**: The British had established a ‘home rule’ parliament and had no desire to overturn it. The Irish wanted all-Ireland recognition for the Dáil: they were prepared to concede some level of devolution to majority-Unionist counties once the ultimate authority of the Dáil was recognised.
Relevant sources

Source 2A
Letter from Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 11 October, 1921

A E[amon], a Chara,
The meeting today has left on my mind the impression that the English Government is anxious for peace and also that this question of naval defence re the coasts of Ireland is a fixed idea of theirs – that they believe it vital to their lives.
The question of the Crown and Ulster did not arise. When they do the sailing will be rough.
Today they were amiable and both sides were quite polite to each other ...

Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan O’Halpin, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1919-1922. Royal Irish Academy, 1998, p.274

Source 2B
Erskine Childers to Eamon de Valera, 21 October, 1921

... The question of the Crown has now been directly raised by the British Representatives and will come up at the Conference on Monday. Two courses are open to the Delegates:-
(a) To refuse allegiance to the Crown,
(b) Neither to refuse it or accept it at the present stage but to say that they are satisfied on other points - Ulster, Defence, Trade etc. – they would be prepared to consider the question of the Crown: in other words to obtain a field of manoeuvre and delay the crucial question.
They request instructions as to which course to adopt.
It must be added that the British Representatives showed a strong desire to press matters to an immediate issue.

Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan O’Halpin, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1919-1922. Royal Irish Academy, 1998, p.287

Show your historical understanding:

1. In Sources 2A and 2B, what exactly is meant by “the question of the Crown”?
2. Explain Griffith’s comments in Source 2A about the question of naval defence being a “fixed idea” of the British delegation.
3. Explain Griffith’s comments in source 2A about what he thinks will happen when the issues of the Crown and Ulster arise.
4. According to Griffith in Source 2A, how did the two delegations get on with each other on 11 October, the first day of the conference?
5. In Source 2B, Erskine Childers, as secretary to the delegation, is writing to de Valera on 21 October looking for instructions on an issue that has now been raised. What is that issue?
6. What does Childers mean in source 2B when he writes that “the British Representatives showed a strong desire to press matters to an immediate issue”? 

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Source 2C
Letter of Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 24 October, 1921

A chara,
[Michael] and I were asked to see Lloyd George and Chamberlain this evening at the conclusion of the Conference.
They talked freely – Chamberlain frankly. The burden of their story was that on the Crown they must fight. It was the only link of Empire they possessed.
They pressed me to say that I would accept the Crown provided we came to other agreements. It was evident they wanted something to reassure themselves against the Die-Hards. I told them I had no authority. If we came to an agreement on all other points I could recommend some form of association with the Crown ...
Told them the only possibility of Ireland considering association of any kind with Crown was in exchange for essential unity ...

Source 2D
Arthur Griffith to David Lloyd George, 22 Hans Place, London, 2 November, 1921

Sir,
In our personal conversation on Sunday night you stated that three things were vital – our attitude to the British Commonwealth, the Crown and Naval Defence. You asked me whether, provided I was satisfied on other points, I would give you personal assurances in relation to these matters. I assured you in reply that, provided I was so satisfied, I was prepared to recommend a free partnership of Ireland with the other States associated within the British Commonwealth, the formula defining the partnership to be arrived at in later discussion. I was, on the same condition, prepared to recommend that Ireland should consent to a recognition of the Crown as head of the proposed association of free States.

... I stated that this attitude of mine was conditional on the recognition of the essential unity of Ireland.


Show your historical understanding:
1. Who were the four people involved in the meeting described by Griffith in Source 2C?
2. What was the British position on the issue of “the Crown”, as described in Source 2C?
3. According to Source 2C, what did Griffith say would be necessary before any concession could be made in relation to the Crown?
4. In Source 2C, explain the difference between the British reference to the need to “accept the Crown” and Griffith’s references to “association with the Crown”.
5. According to Source 2D, what “assurances” did Lloyd George look for from Griffith?
6. In relation to source 2D, explain fully what Griffith said he was prepared to recommend and what this attitude was “conditional on”?
Source 2E

Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 12 November, 1921

... I have just seen [Lloyd George]
... Lloyd George and his colleagues are sending a further reply to the Ulstermen ... offering to create an all-Ireland Parliament, Ulster to have the right to vote itself out within 12 months, but if it does a Boundary Commission to be set up to delimit the area, and the part that remains after the Commission has acted to be subject to equal financial burdens with England.

Lloyd George intimated that this would be their last word to Ulster. If they refused, as he believed they would, he would fight, summon Parliament, appeal to it against Ulster ...

I told him it was his proposal not ours. He agreed but he said that when they were fighting next Thursday with the ‘Die-Hards’ and Ulster in front, they were lost if we cut the ground away behind them by repudiating the proposal.

I said we would not do that ... I could not guarantee its acceptance, as, of course, my colleagues knew nothing of it yet. But I would guarantee that while he was fighting the ‘Ulster’ crowd we would not help them by repudiating him.

Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan O’Halpin, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1919-1922. Royal Irish Academy, 1998, pp.307-308

Show your historical understanding:
1. In Source 2E, reference is made to a proposal for a boundary commission.
   (i) Explain the circumstances in which this proposed commission would be set up.
   (ii) Explain the purposes for which this proposed commission would be set up.
2. In Source 2E, what response did Lloyd George tell Griffith he expected from “the Ulstermen”?
3. According to Source 2E, what guarantee did Griffith give to Lloyd George in relation to the boundary commission proposal?

Source 2F

Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 22 November, 1921

The accompanying Memo ... was handed in at Downing Street today at 12.30.

About half an hour later Jones rang me up and asked could he see me immediately. I told him to come to Hans Place where he arrived about 1.15. He said Lloyd George was in despair about the document. Birkenhead and Chamberlain also considered it impossible. It did not accept the Crown or the Empire. It bought them back to where they were six weeks ago ... He suggested the document should be withdrawn or substituted, as Lloyd George’s only idea of a reply to it was a letter ending the negotiations.

Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan O’Halpin, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1919-1922. Royal Irish Academy, 1998, p.313

Show your historical understanding:
1. Check the “List of significant developments” on p. 24. What was the purpose of the “Memo” (memorandum) mentioned in Source 2F that was handed in at Downing Street on 22 November?
2. Who is the “Jones” mentioned in Source 2F? What position did he hold?
3. According to Source 2F, why was the memo unacceptable to the British side?
4. According to Source 2F, what response to the memo was Lloyd George considering?
Source 2G

Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 29 November, 1921

Last night (Monday) Mr. Duggan and myself at Lloyd George’s request went to Chequers to meet Lloyd George. We met him there with Lord Birkenhead and Sir Robert Horne, Chancellor of the Exchequer. They declared the document we had sent in earlier was impossible for them. No British Government could attempt to propose to the British people the abrogation [cancellation] of the Crown. It would be splashed to atoms. We told them we had no authority to deal with them on any other basis than the exclusion of the Crown from purely Irish affairs. We then entered into a general discussion in which they knocked out my argument that the Crown in the Dominions was merely a symbol but in Ireland a reality – by offering to put in any phrase in the Treaty we liked to ensure that the function of the Crown in Ireland should be no more in practice than it is in Canada or any Dominion ...


Show your historical understanding:

1. Who were the five people attending the meeting referred to in Source 2G? Where did the meeting take place?
2. According to Source 2G, why was the document sent in by the Irish delegation unacceptable to the British Government?
3. According to Source 2G, what was the Irish position in relation to the Crown?
4. According to Source 2G, what did the British representatives say in an effort to persuade the Irish representatives to accept the Crown?

Source 2H

David Lloyd George to Arthur Griffith (London), 30 November, 1921

I enclose a draft of the Treaty which we are prepared to submit for the approval of Parliament ...


Show your historical understanding:

1. A draft Treaty was sent to the Irish delegation two days after the meeting described in Source 2G. According to Source 2H, who else would need to approve this draft Treaty before it could become effective?
2. On the Irish side, who would need to approve any draft Treaty before it could become effective?
Source 2I

Extract from “Conference on Ireland: Proposed Articles of Agreement” [marked “Secret”].
30 November, 1921

Ireland shall have the same national status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State ...
The oath to be taken by members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form:-

I ........... solemnly swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State; to the Community of Nations known as the British Empire; and to the King as the Head of the State and of the Empire ...

If after the expiration of six months and before the expiration of twelve months ... an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland ... the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland and ... ... a Commission shall be appointed by the British Government to determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland ...

Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan O’Halpin, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1919-1922. Royal Irish Academy, 1998, pp.321-328

Show your historical understanding:

1. As set down in Source 2I, what “national status was Ireland to have?
2. Explain the meaning of the term “Executive” as used in Source 2I.
3. As set down in Source 2I, what was to be the official name of the new state?
4. In relation to the proposed oath to be taken by the members of parliament in the new state (as set down in Source 2I),
   (i) What was the first thing to which “true faith and allegiance” was sworn?
   (ii) What recognition was to be given to the King?
5. In the period of transition (expected to be between 6 and 12 months), Northern Ireland was to continue to be ruled by its home rule parliament. If the Northern Ireland parliament did not wish to be part of the Irish Free State, according to Source 2I what steps were to be taken?
6. Explain the terms under which the proposed Commission was to operate, as set down in Source 2I.
Source 2J

Excerpts from copy of secretary’s notes of meeting of the cabinet and delegation held in Dublin on 3 December, 1921

Meeting of cabinet and delegation
In reply to a question by Minister of Defence as to who was responsible for the splitting of the Delegation so that two Members (Messrs. Griffith and Collins) did most of the work and the other members were not in possession of full information it was stated that the British Government was responsible but it had the approval of the whole delegation. The Minister of Defence here remarked that the British Government selected its men. On the motion of Mr. Griffith this remark was withdrawn.

Meeting of cabinet
In the course of a lengthy discussion of the Treaty, the President gave it as his opinion that it could not be accepted in its then form. He personally could not subscribe to the Oath of Allegiance nor could he sign any document which would give N.E. Ulster the power to vote itself out of the Irish State. With modifications, however, it might be accepted honourably, and he would like to see the plenipotentiaries go back and secure peace if possible.

Meeting of cabinet and delegation (resumed)
(a) Mr. Griffith would not take the responsibility of breaking on the Crown …
(b) The President took his stand on the Irish proposals which meant external association with the Crown. He suggested the following amendments to the Oath of Allegiance:-
‘I … do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the constitution of the Irish Free State, to the Treaty of Association and to recognise the King of Great Britain as Head of the Associated States. …
Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan O’Halpin, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1919-1922. Royal Irish Academy, 1998, p.344-345

Show your historical understanding:
1. What was the name of the Minister of Defence referred to in Source 2J?
2. (a) According to Source 2J, who was responsible for the splitting of the delegation so that Griffith and Collins did most of the work?
   (b) According to Source 2J, who approved this arrangement?
3. According to Source 2J, what remark made by the Minister of Defence had to be subsequently withdrawn? Why was this?
4. Who is the person referred to as “the President” in Source 2J?
5. According to Source 2J, what details of the draft Treaty were most unacceptable to the President?
6. According to Source 2J, did the President want the draft Treaty rejected outright? Explain your answer.
7. From your reading of Source 2J, which of these statements is accurate? Give the reasons for your choice.
   (i) Neither the President nor Griffith favoured any relationship with the Crown.
   (ii) Griffith was more prepared to compromise on the issue of the Crown.
   (iii) The President was totally opposed to any form of oath of allegiance.
8. What differences are there between the proposed amendments to the oath as set out in Source 2J and the wording in the draft Treaty as set out in Source 2I?
Arthur Griffith to Eamon de Valera, 4 December, 1921

… They talked of their difficulties. We said we had just as many. We had tried to meet them. They asked what was the difficulty about going in like Canada in the Empire. Gavin Duffy said that we should be as closely associated with them as the Dominions in the large matters, and more so in the matter of defence, but our difficulty is coming within the Empire. They jumped up at this and the conversation came to a close, we undertaking to send them copies of our proposals tomorrow, and they undertaking to send in a formal rejection tomorrow. They would, they said, inform Craig tomorrow that the negotiations were broken down. We then parted.


**Show your historical understanding:**

1. According to Source 2K, what did Gavan Duffy say that caused the British representatives to end the talks?
2. What were the positions of the two delegations as the talks broke up, according to Source 2K?
Step 3: What were the circumstances in which the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty were signed in the early hours of 6 December?

**Significant developments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Lloyd George met Collins regarding boundary commission proposal.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afternoon: final session began. Lloyd George produced written agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of 12 November, indicating Griffith prepared to accept Empire if effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>boundary commission established. Also threatened immediate resumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of war if delegates did not sign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December</td>
<td>2:10am, Articles of Agreement signed.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Relevant sources**

**Source 3A**

Memorandum of an interview between Michael Collins and David Lloyd George, 9.30am, Monday, 5 December, 1921

Mr. Griffith ... indicated to me last night that Mr. Lloyd George desired to see me. This conversation took place subsequent to the official conference held at 10 Downing Street on Sunday evening at 5 p.m. I did not attend this conference for the reason that I had in my own estimation fully argued all points. This morning Mr. Griffith came to see me again and suggested in his official capacity as Chairman of the Delegation that I should have the meeting with Lloyd George as so much depended on the Delegation at this vital time ...

Mr. Lloyd George opened the conversation indicating that he was having a meeting of his Cabinet at 12 o’clock and was putting it to them that the Conference had broken as a result of the interview last night ... He went on to say that the break was therefore definitely on the question of ‘within or without’ the Empire ... I said that I was perfectly dissatisfied with the position as regards the North East ... I said ... that for my part I was anxious to secure a definite reply from Craig and his colleagues, and that I was as agreeable to a reply rejecting as accepting. In view of the former we would save Tyrone and Fermanagh, parts of Derry, Armagh and Down by a boundary Commission.


**Show your historical understanding:**

1. According to Source 3A, why had Michael Collins not attended the conference on Sunday, 4 December?
2. What circumstances mentioned in Source 3A help to explain why Michael Collins met Lloyd George on Monday, 5 December?
3. In Source 3A, what issue had caused the breakdown in talks according to Lloyd George?
4. According to Source 3A, whose views on the Ulster issue was Collins anxious to hear?
5. According to Source 3A, what view did Collins hold of the boundary commission that would be set up in the event of rejection of the proposals on Ulster by Ulster Unionists?
Source 3B
Notes by Robert Barton of two sub-conferences held on December 5/6, 1921 at 10 Downing St.

PRESENT:  
BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES  
MR. LLOYD GEORGE  
MR. CHAMBERLAIN  
LORD BIRKENHEAD  
MR. CHURCHILL  

IRISH REPRESENTATIVES  
MR. GRIFFITH  
MR. COLLINS  
MR. BARTON

SUB-CONFERENCE NO. 1  
3 P.M.

The conference opened by **LLOYD GEORGE** stating that he must know once and for all exactly where we stood as regards the Ulster proposals. He said that the Ulster proposals in the document now before us were exactly those to which Arthur Griffith had agreed and on which he had undertaken not to let him (Lloyd George) down.

**ARTHUR GRIFFITH** replied that he had not let him down and did not intend to do so. **MICHAEL COLLINS** said that for us to agree to any conditions defining the future relations of Great Britain and Ireland prior to Craig’s giving his assent to the unity of Ireland was impossible.

... That every document we ever sent them stated that any proposals for the association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth of Nations was conditional upon the unity of Ireland ...

**LLOYD GEORGE** got excited. He shook his papers in the air, declared that we were trying deliberately to bring about a break on Ulster because our people in Ireland had refused to come within the Empire and that Arthur Griffith was letting him down where he had promised not to do so. He produced a paper from an envelope, stated that he had shown it to Arthur Griffith ... and that Arthur Griffith had agreed to its contents ... The paper was then passed across the table ...

**ARTHUR GRIFFITH** declared his adhesion to his undertaking ...

**LLOYD GEORGE** said that on Trade he was prepared to agree provisionally that there should be freedom on both sides to impose any tariffs either liked subject to the Articles of Agreement being accepted by us ...

We then went back to Ulster.

**ARTHUR GRIFFITH** agreed that he personally would sign the Treaty whether Craig accepted or not, but that his colleagues were in a different position from himself in that they were not party to the promise not to let Lloyd George down ...

**LLOYD GEORGE** stated that he had always taken it that Arthur Griffith spoke for the Delegation, that we were all plenipotentiaries, and that it was now a matter of peace and war and we must each of us make up our minds. He required that every delegate should sign the document and recommend it, or there was no agreement ... he ... said very solemnly that those who were not for peace must take full responsibility for the war that would immediately follow refusal by any Delegate to sign the Articles of Agreement. ...

There was a discussion amongst ourselves lasting from 9 to 11.15 at 22, Hans Place, at which a decision was eventually reached to recommend the Treaty to the Dáil.

SUB-CONFERENCE NO. II  
11.15 P.M. – 2.20 a.m.

At 11.30 we returned to Downing Street and attacked the document again ...

**LLOYD GEORGE** ... asked whether we as a Delegation were prepared to accept these Articles of Agreement and to stand by them in our Parliament as they as a Delegation would stand by them in theirs.

**Arthur Griffith** replied ‘We do’ ... The final draft was read over, agreed to and signed ... The British Delegation lined up to shake hands and say good-bye, and the Conference ended at 2.20 a.m. on December 6th.

Show your historical understanding:

1. According to Source 3B, who were the seven men that attended the final ‘sub-conferences’ on 5/6 December?
2. According to Source 3B, what arguments did Lloyd George make at the beginning of the sub-conference no. 1?
3. According to Source 3B, what response to Lloyd George’s argument was made by
   (i) Arthur Griffith?
   (ii) Michael Collins?
4. According to Source 3B, what was Lloyd George’s reaction when he heard the response from Collins?
5. The document produced by Lloyd George originated in a meeting of 12 November. What had been agreed at that meeting according to Source 2E (p. 27)?
6. According to Source 3B, what concession on trade did Lloyd George make?
7. According to Source 3B, as the discussion went back to the issue of Ulster, what significant statement did Griffith make?
8. According to Source 3B, what difference was there between Griffith’s understanding of the promise made in the document and Lloyd George’s understanding of the same?
9. According to Source 3B, what did Lloyd George say to back up his requirement that “every delegate should sign the document and recommend it”?
10. According to Source 3B, when the Irish delegation went back to 22 Hans Place, how long did they take before making a decision as to whether to sign? What decision did they take?
11. Can you work out from Source 3B whether there was any further discussion on the document when the Irish delegates returned to Downing Street at 11.15 p.m.?
12. Besides signing the Articles of Agreement, what else did each member of both delegations undertake to do, according to Source 3B?
13. What was the final action of the British delegates at the end of the second sub-conference, according to Source 3B?

Note: In Source 3B, bold type has been introduced in the editing process to highlight names and other details: it does not appear in the original document.
Show your historical understanding:

1. What impression of the Treaty is presented in Source 3C, published on 7 December, the day after the Articles of Agreement were signed?
2. What other outcome of the Treaty is referred to in Source 3D, published on 9 December?
3. What does Source D suggest is the level of (British) public interest in the Treaty?
Step 4: What divisions emerged in Ireland in December 1921, following the signing of the Treaty?

Significant developments

1921
7 December  Cabinet meeting (De Valera, Brugha, Stack, Cosgrave, O’Higgins). At insistence of Cosgrave, agreement to hear the delegation before any moves towards rejection.
8 December  Meeting of Dáil cabinet (above, plus Griffith, Collins and Barton). Gavan Duffy, Duggan and Childers also invited to attend. Main focus on how the delegates came to sign the document. Cabinet divided:
FOR Griffith, Collins, Barton and Cosgrave
AGAINST de Valera, Brugha and Stack
9 December  Letter from de Valera appeared in press: “I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cannot recommend acceptance.”
14-22 December  Dáil debates on Treaty. 22 December, Dáil recess for Christmas period.

Aftermath

1922
3-10 January  Dáil debates on Treaty resumed
7 January  Dáil approved Treaty, 64 votes to 57.
9 January  De Valera resigned as President of the Dáil but stood for re-election.
10 January  De Valera was defeated by 60 votes to 58. He and all the anti-Treaty deputies walked out and Griffith was elected President.
15 March  De Valera formed Cumann na Poblachta, the anti-Treaty ‘League of the Republic’.
26 March  Members of the IRA opposed to the Treaty held an Army Convention.
9 April  Army Convention established an executive, including Rory O’Connor.
14 April  Four Courts occupied by anti-Treaty forces led by O’Connor.
28 June  Four Courts shelled by pro-Treaty forces. Civil War followed.

Relevant sources

Source 4A

The President ordered that they [the Plenipotentiaries] be summoned back by wire for a Cabinet meeting to take place the next day, the 8th, ‘to consider the circumstances under which the Plenipotentiaries had signed the agreement in London.’ These or some such words appeared in the official note which he drafted for publication. Desmond Fitzgerald, who was in charge of Publicity, came into the room immediately the note had been handed him, and he said, ‘This might be altered Mr. President. It reads as if you were opposed to the settlement.’ ‘And that is the way I intend it to read. Publish it as it is,’ the President told him. Fitzgerald said aside to me a few minutes later. ‘I did not think he was against this kind of settlement before we went over to London.’ I answered – ‘He’s dead against it now anyway. That’s enough.’ Recollection of Austin Stack, cited in Frank Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal. Geoffrey Chapman, 1962 (originally published by Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1935), pp.330-331
Show your historical understanding:
1. Explain what is meant in Source 4A by being “summoned back by wire”?
2. According to Source 4A, what was the purpose for which the President was calling a Cabinet meeting?
3. According to Source 4A, why was Desmond Fitzgerald, Director of Publicity, surprised when he saw the President’s note and when the President told him to publish it without change?
4. According to Source 4A, what was Austin Stack’s view of de Valera’s attitude towards what had been signed?

Source 4B

Austin Stack’s recollection of the cabinet meeting held on 8 December, 1921

The meeting lasted the whole day and late into the night. We were not unfriendly towards one another. The merits and demerits of the Agreement were gone into – but not in detail to any extent. The main thing was how they came to sign ... On and on dragged the discussion, the President, Cathal Brugha and myself doing our best to get the others not to press the document on the Dáil. I thought Collins was seeing the trouble ahead once. I turned to him and spoke of the way the country would be divided and said imploringly, ‘You have signed and undertaken to recommend the document to the Dáil. Well – recommend it. Your duty stops there ...’ But Michael Collins refused point blank to dishonour his signature.

That ended it ... A division was taken ... Barton explained that he thought he was bound to vote for the document having signed it and undertaken to recommend it. Immediately after this meeting, the President wrote a letter to the Press, explaining his position ... This appeared on December 9th. Meantime the ‘Treaty’ and all the propaganda in its favour had three days start and we never made up the handicap. The British and Irish Press carried the people off their feet in favour of the ‘Treaty and Peace’.


Show your historical understanding:
1. According to Source 4B, what was the general tone of the cabinet meeting of 8 December?
2. According to Source 4B, what did the President, Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack himself try to achieve during the discussions?
3. What effect on the country did Stack think there would be if the document were put before the Dáil, according to Source 4B?
4. According to Source 4B, what argument did Stack make to Collins, without success?
5. According to Source 4B, what reason did Barton give for voting for the document at the cabinet meeting?
6. According to Source 4B, what did the President do as soon as the meeting ended?
7. Explain what Stack meant by the following statements in Source 3B: “the ‘Treaty’ and all the propaganda in its favour had three days start and we never made up the handicap.” (Be sure to explain Stack’s use of the term “propaganda” here.)
Source 4C

On a country-wide basis the IRA were in the main anti-Treaty. They began to remember that they were Volunteers with an Executive which was their governing body; they owed allegiance to the Dáil only as the Government of the Republic. There was an alternative course of action to be resorted to if the Dáil failed them. The first person to call my attention to this was Andy Cooney, who was most strongly opposed to the Treaty. He thought that Griffith, Collins and the other signatories should have been arrested at Dun Laoghaire on their return from London. I gathered that his proposal had some support from the South Tipperary Brigade but neither Dublin nor Cork would countenance any such course. The arrest of Mick Collins, however badly they felt about the Treaty, would be like Tibetan monks arresting the Dalai Lama.


Show your historical understanding:

1. According to Source 4C, what was the general feeling amongst IRA members towards the Treaty?
2. C.S. Andrews was at the time himself an I.R.A. man. How relevant is this point in assessing the likely accuracy of the first sentence in Source 4C?
3. According to Source 4C, what did Andy Cooney think should have happened when the delegates returned? Who opposed this course of action? Explain why.

Source 4D

De Valera’s letter to the Press, 9 December, 1921 (extracts)

My friends ... you have seen in the public Press the text of the proposed Treaty with Great Britain. The terms of this Treaty are in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of the Nation as expressed freely in successive elections during the last three years. I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cannot recommend the acceptance of the Treaty either to Dáil Éireann or the country. In this attitude I am supported by the Ministers of Home Affairs and Defence. A public session of Dáil Éireann is being summoned for Wednesday next at 11 o’clock ... The great test of our people has come. Let us face it worthily without bitterness and above all without recriminations. There is a definite constitutional way of resolving our differences ...


Show your historical understanding:

1. According to Source 4D, what reason does de Valera give as to why he “cannot recommend acceptance of the Treaty”?
2. According to Source 4D, which government ministers are supporting de Valera in rejecting the Treaty? (Check the names as well as the ministry.)
3. According to Source 4D, what group of people would be the next to consider the terms of the Treaty?
4. According to Source 4D, did de Valera favour a violent or constitutional way of resolving differences over the Treaty? Explain your answer.
Extracts from the Dáil debates on the Treaty

14 December

Source 4E

Mr. Michael Collins, Minister for Finance
I agree with what the President said that the honour of Ireland was not involved in accepting this document. Ireland is fully free to accept or reject. Many a parliament of a country has refused to accept decisions of plenipotentiaries … The Dáil is perfectly free to accept or reject, we are only bound to recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance. The Articles of Agreement are put forward on our recommendation. That ought to be quite clear here, and ought to be equally clear to the public of this country …

Source 4F

President de Valera
Now we all can go back to meetings of the Dáil. At these meetings I made our position perfectly clear, that the plenipotentiaries were to have the fullest freedom possible. It would be ridiculous to send them over if we were all the time to interfere with them from Dublin. There was an understanding that certain things would be done so that we in Dublin would be in a position to help in so far as we could help to come to an agreement or explain disagreements. The most important paragraph in these instructions … was paragraph 3, which laid down that a complete draft of the Treaty should be submitted to Dublin and a reply awaited … In fact one of the reasons I did not want to be a member of the delegation was that the delegation should be provided against hasty action.

19 December

Source 4G

Mr. Griffith, Minister for Foreign Affairs
We have brought back the flag; we have brought back the evacuation of Ireland after 700 years by British troops and the formation of an Irish army (applause). We have brought back to Ireland her full rights and powers of fiscal control. We have brought back to Ireland equality with England … We took an oath to the Irish Republic, but, as President de Valera himself said, he understood that oath to bind him to do the best he could for Ireland. So do we. We have done the best we could for Ireland … That is what we have brought back … an Ireland developing her own life, carving out her own way of existence, and rebuilding the Gaelic civilisation broken down at the battle of Kinsale … I ask the people of Ireland, and the Irish people everywhere, to ratify this Treaty, to end this bitter conflict of centuries, to end it for ever.

Source 4H

Mr. Austin Stack, Minister for Home Affairs
I stand for what is Ireland's right, full independence and nothing short of it. It is easy to understand that countries like Australia, New Zealand and the others can put up with the powers which are bestowed on them, can put up with acknowledgments to the monarch and rule of Great Britain as head of their State, for have they not all sprung from England? Are they not children of England? Have they not been built up by Great Britain? Have they not been protected by England and lived under England's flag for all time? What other feeling can they have but affection for England, which they always regarded as their motherland? This country, on the other hand, has not been a child of England's, nor never was. England came here as an invader, and for 750 years we have been resisting that conquest. Are we now after those 750 years to bend the knee and acknowledge that we received from England as a concession full, or half, or three-quarter Dominion powers? I say no.
Source 4I

Count Plunkett, Leitrim and North Roscommon
I am not going, whatever the threat of war or any other device, to abandon the cause to which I have devoted my life. I am faithful to my oath. I am faithful to the dead. I am faithful to my own boys, one of whom died for Ireland with his back to the wall and the other two who were sentenced to death ... I am no more an enemy of peace than Arthur Griffith ... but I will never sacrifice the independence of Ireland simply for the purpose of securing a cessation of warfare.

Source 4J

Mr. Michael Collins, Minister for Finance
The communication of September 29th from Lloyd George made it clear that they were going into a conference not on the recognition of the Irish Republic, and I say if we all stood on the recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we could very easily have said so, and there would be no conference. What I want to make clear is that it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise. I was sent there to form that adaptation, to bear the brunt of it. Now as one of the signatories of the document I naturally recommend its acceptance. I do not recommend it for more than it is. Equally I do not recommend it for less than it is. In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it (applause).

Source 4K

Mr. R.C. Barton, Kildare and Wicklow
I am going to make plain to you the circumstances under which I find myself in honour bound to recommend the acceptance of the Treaty ... On Sunday, December 4th, the Conference had ... broken down. An intermediary effected contact next day, and on Monday at 3 p.m., Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, and myself met the English representatives. In the struggle that ensued Arthur Griffith sought, repeatedly to have the decision between war and peace on the terms of the Treaty referred back to this assembly. This proposal Mr. Lloyd George directly negatived. He claimed that we were plenipotentiaries and that we must either accept or reject. Speaking for himself and his colleagues, the English Prime Minister with all the solemnity and the power of conviction that he alone, of all men I met, can impart by word and gesture ... declared that the signature and recommendation of every member of our delegation was necessary or war would follow immediately. He gave us until 10 o'clock to make up our minds, and it was then about 8.30. We returned to our house to decide upon our answer. The issue before us was whether we should stand behind our proposals for external association, face war and maintain the Republic, or whether we should accept inclusion in the British Empire and take peace. Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, and Eamonn Duggan were for acceptance and peace; Gavan Duffy and myself were for refusal - war or no war. An answer that was not unanimous committed you to immediate war, and the responsibility for that was to rest directly upon those two delegates who refused to sign. For myself, I preferred war. I told my colleagues so, but for the nation, without consultation, I dared not accept that responsibility. The alternative which I sought to avoid seemed to me a lesser outrage than the violation of what is my faith. So that I myself, and of my own choice, must commit my nation to immediate war, without you, Mr. President, or the Members of the Dáil, or the nation having an opportunity to examine the terms upon which war could be avoided. I signed, and now I have fulfilled my undertaking I recommend to you the Treaty I signed in London (applause).
20 December, 1921

Source 4L

Mr. Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh, Dublin City

We have survived until to-day, and by heavens, in spite of this Treaty, we will survive. Even if it is ratified, before one year is out the Irish people will of themselves burst up this Treaty. They will turn their backs upon the men who have foisted it upon them and repudiate a document so radically opposed to all they thought worth living and dying for. Let me earnestly appeal to all assembled here to reject this Treaty unanimously... I cannot bear to live to see such a man as Arthur Griffith, who has been an inspiration to us all, or even younger men who have won fame the wide world over for a heroism that is peculiar to Ireland, men such as Michael Collins, Dick Mulcahy, Seán MacKeon, and many, many of their associates - I cannot bear to see these men acting as Ministers and Generals in the name of his Majesty King George V. in Ireland ... We should all throw back at England this instrument of our subversion. We should all stand shoulder to shoulder in this act as we did in the fight. There should be no two sides on this vital question.

Show your historical understanding:

1. In Source 4E, what is the main point that Collins makes about the Articles of Agreement that were signed by himself and the other delegates in London on 6 December?
2. In Source 4F, what are de Valera’s views of the role of the plenipotentiaries?
3. What instruction given to the plenipotentiaries does de Valera refer to in Source 4F?
4. Explain what de Valera says in Source 4F about his own decision to remain in Dublin during the negotiations.
5. List the positive achievements brought back from London, according to Griffith in Source 4G.
6. In Source 4G, what does Griffith say about the oath that he and his fellow Sinn Féin leaders had taken to the Republic?
7. In Source 4H, what distinction does Stack make between Ireland and the other countries that have been granted dominion status?
8. In Source 4I, to whom is Count Plunkett referring when, in speaking of his sons, he mentions “one of whom died for Ireland with his back to the wall”?
9. According to Source 4I, why is Count Plunkett unable to accept the Treaty?
    (ii) What point does Collins make about the Sinn Féin acceptance of this proposal?
11. In Source 4J, what does Collins give as his opinion of the terms set out in the Articles of Agreement?
12. In Source 4K, Barton describes the final discussions in London. (See Source 3B, p. 33, for Barton’s contemporaneous notes on the discussions.) What does Barton say about how the discussions got underway again following the break-down of the talks on Sunday, 4th December?
13. According to Source 4K, what did Griffith repeatedly request of Lloyd George? On what basis, according to Source 4K, did Lloyd George turn down this request?
14. According to Source 4K, what ultimatum did Lloyd George give to the Irish delegation?
15. According to Source 4K, when the delegates went back to their house to discuss the ultimatum, who was for the peace terms and who was against?
16. According to Source 4K, what explanation does Barton give of his own decision to sign?
17. In Source 4L, what does the speaker predict will happen if the Treaty is ratified? Was he right in this prediction?
18. In Source 4L, explain the speaker’s attitude to Griffith, Collins and the other named leaders who were in favour of the Treaty?
19. In Source 4L, what response to the Treaty does the speaker want?
AFTERMATH: TWO SOURCES FROM THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRELAND

Source X: Print attributed to Constance de Markiewicz  
Source Y: Pro-Treaty poster, c.1922

Interrogating the sources:  
Source X  
1. Who are the three figures represented in this print?  
2. What role did each of these men play in the Treaty negotiations, October-December, 1921?  
3. This print is attributed to Constance de Markiewicz who opposed the Treaty. What clues are there in the picture and in the text to show that she was anti-Treaty?  
4. Is this source more helpful (a) in helping us understand the actions of Griffith and Collins?  
   (b) in helping us understand the perspective of Constance de Markiewicz?

Interrogating the sources:  
Source Y  
1. Pick out five of the points listed that would appear to be clear benefits to Ireland of the Treaty settlement. In each case, give reasons for your choice.  
2. Pick out three points that opponents of the Treaty may have contradicted. In each case, say what argument an opponent of the Treaty may have made in relation to the point.  
3. Which of the statements made on the poster are most likely to be seen as propaganda? Justify your answer by  
   (a) explaining what ‘propaganda’ involves and  
   (b) explain how the statements you have picked measure up to your definition of ‘propaganda’.
Card-sorting and critical skills

Documents-based study
▼
Development of critical skills
▼
Documents-based question

The documents-based study is “the primary means of developing [students’] skills in working with evidence”. (Syllabus, page 5)

The documents-based question “will test candidates’ ability to interrogate, correlate and evaluate a particular body of evidence”. (Syllabus, page 15)

Rationale for card sorts
In a card sort, cards with text (single words, phrases, sentences) are grouped or ranked according to particular criteria. Card sorts are good in helping students to make connections and form judgements. By having the text on cards, students can move them around, group them and, when necessary, change their minds. This approach promotes discussion and collaborative learning.

The intention of the critical skills exercise on the pages that follow is to illustrate in a practical and active manner the type of critical skills that the documents-based study is designed to develop. Essentially, the purpose of the exercise is to encourage students to think by discussing snippets of evidence and making judgements on their import by deciding whether they support or oppose the given proposition.

In literacy development, such approaches can play a pivotal role as students engage together in purposeful reading and discussion of text and are active participants in the learning process.

What is involved in the critical skills exercise
Each group of 4-5 students is given an A4 sheet with the proposition at the top of the page and two columns headed: Agrees and Disagrees. Each group is also given an envelope containing 8 short documentary extracts – each on its own small strip of paper or cardboard – and the task is to discuss with each other the appropriate column in which to place each extract. In some cases, it may be better if the provenance of the source is not revealed at the outset since the absence of such a contextual framework forces students to focus more closely on the extract as presented. In other cases, it may be necessary to give relevant background for at least some of the speakers. When each group has reached its conclusions, the outcome of the exercise is discussed in a whole group setting. If deemed appropriate, the exercise can end with a “guessing game” where students are asked to link each extract to the correct name from a list read out by the teacher.

A further set of eight supplementary cards is also provided. These could be used to vary the content of the critical skills exercise (e.g. to make it more challenging) and/or along with the initial set of eight cards could be used to sort out the different categories into which arguments for and against the Treaty fell.
Proposition: The deal made by the Irish delegates at the conference in London in December 1921 was a good deal

Place each of the documentary extracts in the appropriate column, depending on whether you think it agrees or disagrees with the above proposition. If the group cannot agree on whether a particular extract agrees or disagrees with the proposition, place it along the dividing line in the middle and wait to hear what other groups have to say about the extract.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agrees</th>
<th>Disagrees</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source A</td>
<td>Source E</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>We have brought back the flag; we have brought back the evacuation of Ireland after 700 years by British troops and the formation of an Irish army. We have brought back to Ireland her full rights and powers of fiscal control.</td>
<td>That document makes British authority our masters in Ireland … are we in this generation, which has made Irishmen famous throughout the world, to sign our names to the most ignoble document that could be signed?</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source B</th>
<th>Source F</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I stand here for the will of the people, and the will of the people of Ireland is for their freedom, which this so-called Treaty does not give them. The will of the people was expressed in December, 1918.</td>
<td>If I, as I hope I will, try to continue to fight for Ireland's liberty, even if this rotten document be accepted, I will fight minus the oath of allegiance and to wipe out the oath of allegiance if I can do it.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source C</th>
<th>Source G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To me this Treaty gives me what I and my comrades fought for; it gives us for the first time in 700 years the evacuation of Britain's armed forces out of Ireland.</td>
<td>In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source D</th>
<th>Source H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… if this Treaty is ratified, the result will be a divided people; the same old division will go on; those who will enter the British Empire and those who will not, and so England's old game of divide and conquer goes on.</td>
<td>I, personally, see no alternative to the acceptance of this Treaty. I see no solid spot of ground upon which the Irish people can put its political feet but upon that Treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source E</td>
<td>Source A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President de Valera</td>
<td>Mr. Arthur Griffith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
<td>(Minister for Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December, 1921</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 December, 1921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source F</th>
<th>Source B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Austin Stack</td>
<td>Miss Mary MacSwiney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Minister for Home Affairs)</td>
<td>(Cork City)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December, 1921</td>
<td>20 December, 1921</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source G</th>
<th>Source C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Michael Collins</td>
<td>Commandant Seán McKeown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Minister for Finance)</td>
<td>(Longford and Westmeath)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December, 1921</td>
<td>19 December, 1921</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source H</th>
<th>Source D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Richard Mulcahy</td>
<td>Mrs. Tom (Kathleen) Clarke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>(Dublin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 December, 1921</td>
<td>20 December, 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source I</td>
<td>Source M</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Treaty is a bargain between two Sovereign States, and our delegates in making that Treaty made the first Treaty that was ever made by Ireland with England and went further to get recognition of Ireland’s sovereign status than all that has been done in all our history.</td>
<td>I have sworn an oath to the Republic, and for that reason I could not vote for the Treaty.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Source J</th>
<th>Source N</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I support the ratification of it because I know that the ideals for which I have worked, and for which others who are listening to me worked through many long and weary years, will be quicker attained by ratification of this Treaty than otherwise.</td>
<td>In short, what is it to be?—an Irish Dominion or Free State if you like—a bow window in the western gable of the British Empire. I will never agree to it, and I say it has been proved here, and let it be disproved by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that this Treaty was a Treaty forced upon them, a Treaty of terror.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Source K</th>
<th>Source O</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… let there be no mistake, under the terms of this Treaty the British Government is going to be supreme in Ireland.</td>
<td>Now I stand for this Treaty on four grounds ... I stand for it because it gives us an army, because it gives us evacuation, because it gives us control over the finances of the country, and lastly, and greatest of all to me, because it gives us control over our education.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Source L</th>
<th>Source P</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… I ask you to say that in this Treaty they have attained something that can be honourably accepted. The welfare and happiness of the men and women and the little children of this nation must, after all, take precedence of political creeds and theories.</td>
<td>Why was my husband murdered? Why am I a widow? Was it that I should come here and give my vote for a Treaty that puts Ireland within the British Empire?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source M</td>
<td>Source I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Seán MacSwiney (West, South and Mid-Cork)</td>
<td>Mr. Patrick Hogan (Galway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 19 December, 1921</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 20 December, 1921</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source N</th>
<th>Source J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Seán Etchingham (Wexford)</td>
<td>Mr. Joseph McBride (North and West Mayo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 20 December, 1921</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 19 December, 1921</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source O</th>
<th>Source K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Finian Lynch (Kerry and Limerick West)</td>
<td>Mr. Erskine Childers (Kildare and Wicklow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 20 December, 1921</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 19 December, 1921</td>
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<tr>
<th>Source P</th>
<th>Source L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Kathleen O’Callaghan (Limerick East and City)</td>
<td>Mr. Kevin O’Higgins (Assistant Minister for Local Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty 20 December, 1921</td>
<td>Dáil debate on Treaty, 19 December, 1921</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Historians’ views about the Treaty negotiations

Secondary Source A
The ... truce in July, and de Valera’s speedy journey to London, was the beginning of the end to the claim for the right to a republic; what was on offer was dominion status ... That such terms were rejected was not perhaps as important as their potential to sow the seeds of division within a movement that had traditionally been a mixture of moderates and hardliners. P. 237
The eventual signing of the Treaty ... was partly a generational compromise between what the older Griffith represented and the younger Collins sought; a compromise between dominion status and the elusive republic. The agreement also reflected a desire to avoid a further debilitating military war which both sides knew they could not win. P.240

Secondary Source B
The Dáil sessions of August demonstrated that the executive was not going to hold out for a fully independent state. The British government simply would not have this. There was a general recognition within the counter-state that a return to guerrilla warfare would not change this position. What was needed was an arrangement with Britain that would satisfy Irish nationalist aspirations as well as British defence concerns p.319
Collins himself did not want to go, but de Valera pushed him into it ... Neither Brugha nor Stack would go, and no one expected them to go. Neither man had demonstrated intellectual subtlety or even capacity; they were simple men with simple ideas ... Here was a recipe for conflict: whatever terms ... Collins and company brought back, Stack and Brugha would not be able to resist the opportunity to attack their arch-rival. P.321

Secondary Source C
[It] really did not make sense for ‘the best player’, as W.T.Cosgrave rightly called him, to remain a non-playing captain in the biggest match his team was ever likely to play. James Craig always tried to present Northern Ireland’s case himself in negotiations with the British. Lloyd George, with a far busier schedule, and also presiding over a potentially awkward cabinet, made sure to lead his team. P.49

Secondary Source D
The Treaty of 1921 did not enable Partition to take place, as sometimes assumed; Partition cleared the way for the Treaty. P.503

Secondary Source E
[In] the final round of negotiations Lloyd George used carrot and stick with equal effectiveness. The British gave way on many points, in particular agreeing that members of the Irish parliament should be obliged to take a mere oath of fidelity to the king in place of the more distasteful oath of allegiance, but the prime minister threatened immediate and terrible war if an agreement were not concluded without delay. P.87
Almost all the gloomy forecasts of British interference in the Free State’s affairs and the limitations on its sovereignty were to be disproved by events, and in the 1930s it was to be de Valera who made good Collins’s claim that the treaty gave Ireland ‘not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop but the freedom to achieve it’. P.88
Interrogating the historians

Our enquiry has focused on the question:

“What happened between July and December 1921 that led to major political division in Ireland?”

1. Which of the historians make the case that compromise on the issue of the republic was inevitable even before the London conference began in October?
2. Which of the historians make reference to the impracticality of renewing the military struggle?
3. Which historian criticises de Valera’s decision not to lead the Treaty delegation? Explain the criticism he makes.
4. Which historians make comments on the circumstances in which the Articles of Agreement were finally signed? Explain these comments.
5. Explain the comment made by R.F. Foster in Secondary Source D.
6. Which of the historians suggests that much of the criticism of the Treaty was proven wrong by what happened afterwards? Explain his view.
7. With regard to the enquiry question above, which of the historians make comments that are directly relevant to this question? In each case, explain how the comment is relevant.

Your conclusions on the enquiry

Based on the evidence you have encountered in the course of the enquiry - and bearing in mind any relevant points made by the historians quoted on the previous page - draw up a list of what you believe are the SIX main reasons for the political divisions that emerged during and after the Treaty negotiations, October-December 1921. Make your case in a written report, devoting one paragraph (or more) to each of the six factors.

OR

Now that we have looked at a wide range of evidence on the reasons the Treaty negotiations caused major political divisions,

- What do you think are the THREE main reasons why these divisions happened?
- For each of the reasons you give, you must back up your reason with evidence from the sources that we have studied.